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Discrimination Claims Under Title VII:
Where Mandatory Arbitration Goes Too Far
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has become one of the most widely used alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. Through the adoption of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925, Congress intended to make it clear that
the resolution of disputes by arbitration was no longer to be disfavored by
the judiciary, but to be a favored alternative.' Far from disfavoring it,
modem judicial entities have embraced arbitration as courts try to deal
with crowded dockets and more complex, lengthy litigation? Since the
enactment of the FAA, courts have become more permissive with respect
to the kinds of disputes in which they will allow settlement by arbitration.
The United States Supreme Court has followed this trend, ruling in a
series of cases that the right to a judicial forum for many federally created
statutory rights can be waived by contractually agreeing to submit any
dispute to binding arbitration This Note will address the issue of
whether rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' are
important enough that an agreement to arbitrate will not preclude an
employee's right to enforce them through a trial de novo.
The analysis of this question will begin by focusing on cases
decided by the Supreme Court which developed the criteria for
determining what statutory rights are beyond the reach of binding
arbitration agreements. These tests will then be applied to the statutory
rights supplied by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act) using
a 1974 Supreme Court decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,' and
a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.6 In Alford, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, reversed its earlier
decision and held that contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes,
including those involving Title VII rights, are enforceable. This Note will
question whether the Fifth Circuit should have overruled its prior decision
in the Alford case, and suggest that, absent an explicit ruling by the
Supreme Court, agreements to arbitrate such as the one in Alford should
1. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
2. Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 104 HARv. L. REv. 568 (1990).
3. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
5. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
6. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
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not be enforceable.
II. BACKGROUND - THE SUPREME COURT'S CRITERIA
FOR DErERMINING WHICH STATUTORY RIGHTS
ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL FORUM
The global trend toward alternative dispute resolution has been
reflected clearly in recent decisions by the Supreme Court expanding the
scope of the FAA. 7 The FAA was passed in 1925 to reverse the
traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements' by providing
that such agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."" For many years the FAA was found to apply only in the
federal courts, and was thus only important in cases involving diversity or
admiralty jurisdiction."°  By 1953, it was established that the FAA
extended to controversies involving federal statutory rights, although
courts still tended to view the competence of arbitration proceedings with
suspicion. By 1983, the Court had clearly established the presumption of
arbitrability, noting that the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal
7. Michael Lieberman, Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims:
The Triumph of Substantive over Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc.
138, U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1822 (1990).
8. The House Report accompanying the bill states: "[t]he need for the law arises from
the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction .... This jealousy survived
for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law
and was adopted with it by the American courts." H.R. REP. No. 96, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
pt. 6 at 1-2 (1924). A typical pre-FAA case is Hamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U.S.
370 (1890), where the Court held that a contractual agreement in a fire insurance policy to
submit the question of damages to arbitrators was held not to bar a judicial action on the
same issue.
9. The FAA provides in part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
10. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1311 n.29 (1985).
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law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."' Under this jurisprudence, disputes
involving federal statutory rights under RICO, the Securities Act of 1934,
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act have been compelled to
binding arbitration pursuant to a contract.1 But, as the Court recognized
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp.,' "all statutory claims may not be
appropriate for arbitration."' There remains, therefore, the question of
which statutory claims are not appropriate in the opinion of the Supreme
Court.
As cases came before the Supreme Court asserting that various
federal statutory rights were not appropriate for mandatory arbitration, the
Court developed two criteria for determining which statutory rights would
qualify. The original criterion was evidence of Congressional intent to
preserve a judicial forum. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,' the Court explained:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, the intention
would be deducible from text or legislative history. Having
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.1 6
The Court expanded the test when it set forth a second criterion
by which a statutory right could be considered exempt from a contractual
agreement to arbitrate. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon," the Court stated that an intent to limit or prohibit waiver of
a judicial forum could also be deducible "from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose."' Thus, after
11. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
12. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (RICO and the
Securities Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (antitrust); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
(FLSA).
13. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
14. Id. at 1652.
15. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
16. Id. at 628.
17. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
18. Id. at 227.
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Shearson/American Express there are two tests for determining whether a
federal statutory right is exempt from arbitration: first, can Congressional
intent to preclude binding arbitration of the statutory right be found in the
text or legislative history of the statute; second, is there an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose?
Ill. THE "CONGRESSIONAL INTENT" TEST APPLIED
TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. Intent in the Text of the Statute
It would be difficult to show from the text of the statute that
Congress intended to preclude judicial waiver of Title VII rights in favor
of arbitration, since there is no reference to arbitration in the statute
itself. 9 The enforcement provision of Title VII reflects Congressional
concern that employers be allowed to make non-discriminatory business
decisions with respect to employees. This concern "led Congress to
compound the inevitable complexities of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "'
The result is a lengthy enforcement provision, which provides for
enforcement by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the Attorney General, and the individual grievants themselves.'
Although nowhere in this comprehensive provision is there any mention of
precluding arbitration, it should be noted that no jurisprudence with
respect to arbitration had been developed when the Act was passed.'
Courts therefore cannot accept the absence of a clause prohibiting
arbitration in the enforcement provision as evidence that Congress did not
intend to preclude mandatory arbitration of Title VII disputes, for the
Supreme Court has said that a court, when interpreting a statute, "must
19. The enforcement provision of Title VII is set out at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does acknowledge the use of arbitration, stating that "[w]here appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials,
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by this title." Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991).
How much this changes the existing relationship between Title VII and arbitration is
debateable. The cases and legislation suggest that, with respect to Title VII, arbitration is not
appropriate or authorized by law.
20. Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Cvil Rights Act of 1964, 32
U. CHI. L. REV. 430 (1965).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
22. Nicholas W. Lobenthal, The Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: Toward an Epistemology
of Congressional Silence, 23 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 67, 80 (1989).
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take into account its contemporary legal context."' What the
enforcement provision does indicate is that by offering an array of
enforcement mechanisms, Congress intended that a grievant have as many
fora as possible for pursuing his claim. Forcing the grievant to arbitrate is
therefore not consistent with the enforcement provisions of Title VII.
There is language from which an inference can be drawn that
Congress intended to preserve a judicial forum for Title VII claims.
Without addressing the issue of alternative fora specifically, the text of the
statute does provide that "[e]adh United States district court and each
United States court of a place subject to the jtrisdiction of the United
States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subehapter." '
While this language is strong evidence of an implied Congressional intent
for the federal courts to have final jurisdiction, without any specific
mention of arbitration in the text, the legislative history must be examined
to find the intent of Congress.
B. Intent in the Legislative History
Determining the intent of Congress through the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act presents some problems. The volume of legislative
history generated by this Act is such that it is difficult to ascertain
anything but broad areas of intent. In addition, many have questioned the
value of using legislative history to determine the intent of the drafters of a
statute.' Despite these problems, the same Court that proposed the
"legislative history" test made its own determination of the legislative
history of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.' The Supreme
Court's analysis of Title VII rights in this case clearly shows that the
statute provides the type of rights that meet one or both of the tests
established, and thus requires a judicial forum for their resolution.
The issue in Alexander was whether submission of a Title VII
discrimination claim to arbitration, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, foreclosed the right to a judicial forum for the same grievance.
Harrell Alexander worked for the Gardner-Denver Co., whose employees
23. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3) (1982).
25. Frank Easterbrook has noted that "the domain of the statute should be restricted to
cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process . . .
[b]ecause legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,'
hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a
whole, however, has only outcomes." Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV., 533, 544, 547 (1983).
26. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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were covered under a collective bargaining agreement that had been
negotiated by the employees' union. Alexander was fired, and he filed a
grievance claiming he was unjustly discharged.' Before his case
proceeded to arbitration, Alexander raised the claim that his dismissal was
the result of racial discrimination. He also filed a separate charge of
discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred
the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
The arbitrator found that Alexander had been discharged for cause, and
the EEOC found that there was no reasonable cause to believe that there
had been a violation of Title VII. Alexander then filed his action in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado.' The district
court granted summary judgment to Gardner-Denver, finding that
Alexander, having submitted the issue to an arbitrator, was bound by the
arbitrator's decision. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
on the same basis. 9  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this
decision, holding that an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo
under Title VII was not foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to
final arbitration.
In finding that a grievant does not forfeit his right of action by
submitting to arbitration, the Court looked at the legislative history of Title
VII and determined "that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it
necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. "" In their analysis of the issue, the
Court determined Congressional intent relating to several aspects of Title
VII. They found that the lengthy enforcement provisions of Title VII were
promulgated to "allow an individual to pursue independently his rights
under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The
clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."3 Apparently the Court felt that Congressional support
of the Civil Rights Act was so strong that its intention was to provide as
much power of enforcement as it could. The Court reinforced this notion
by holding that the doctrine of election of remedies (on which the district
court had relied in part in enforcing the arbitrator's decision) had no
27. At this time, Alexander made no claim of race discrimination, which was brought up
for the first time in the last step of a multi-stepped grievance procedure that preceded
arbitration.
28. Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (1971).
29. Alexanderv. Gardner-DenverCo., 466 F.2d 1209 (1972).
30. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). The Court adds,
"[ilt is the duty of the courts to assure the full availability of this forum." Id.
31. Id. at 48-49.
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application in this context because the employee's statutory rights under
Title VII were separate from his contractual right to arbitration.
With respect to the question of who is to be the final adjudicator,
the Court found that "[t]he purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate
that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be
inconsistent with that goal."' The Court in this case clearly found
Congressional intent to both maintain multiple fora and provide for the
federal courts to be the final decision makers.
C. The Recent Treatment of the Findings in Alexander
Notwithstanding this clear enunciation of Congress' intent as to
the importance of the rights granted by the Civil Rights Act, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court in Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,' held an agreement nearly identical to the
one in Alexander to be enforceable. As a condition of her employment as
a stock broker with Dean Witter, Joan Alford signed a registration
agreement with the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. The agreement contained a broad
arbitration clause stating that she agreed to submit any controversy arising
out of her employment to arbitration. After being fired, Alford brought a
Title VII suit alleging sex discrimination and sexual harassment.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration,
pursuant to the registration agreement. In his opinion for the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Judge Hittner held that the
arbitration clause could not be enforced to compel arbitration of a Title
VII discrimination claim. Summarizing the two tests for arbitrability
noted earlier, the district court found that "[t]he court in Alexander
examined the intention of Congress in passing Title VII and found not only
that Congress intended the federal courts to exercise final responsibility for
the enforcement of Title VII, . . . but also that there was inherent conflict
between arbitration and the congressional purpose of Title VII. "'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The court noted that "as a matter of federal law [under the FAA], any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor
32. Id. at 56.
33. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
34. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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of arbitration." 5 The court also recognized recent Supreme Court cases
holding that contractual provisions for arbitration of various federal
statutory rights were enforceable. 6 The court held, however, that the
Supreme Court's holding in Alexander governed their decision, and that
persons bringing suits under Title VII would not be held to compulsory
arbitration agreements that were part of an employment contract.
The case reached the Supreme Court,37 which ordered the Fifth
Circuit to reconsider Alford in light of its recent decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.' In Gilmer, the plaintiff also signed a
registration application with several securities exchanges, which required
him to submit any controversy regarding his employment to arbitration.
The registration agreement was basically the same as the one signed by
Joan Alford with respect to the issue of arbitration. Gilmer's employment
was terminated in 1987, when he was 62 years old. The Court held that
the plaintiff's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) was subject, under the FAA, to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to his broker registration application. Gilmer conceded that there was
nothing in the text or legislative history of the ADEA that would indicate
an intent to preclude arbitration. The decision therefore rested entirely on
Gilmer's claim that compulsory arbitration would be inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of the ADEA.39
Gilmer had set forth several arguments asserting that there was an
inherent inconsistency in mandating arbitration for ADEA cases.' The
Court dismissed these challenges by noting that the ADEA and its goals
were much like those of other statutes that had been held to be arbitrable.
Also noted was the fact that the recent arbitration decisions by the Court
have held these procedural safeguard arguments insufficient to preclude
arbitration of the claim.4'
Gilmer also relied on Alexander as holding that the arbitration of
employment discrimination was precluded. The Court distinguished
35. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105 (1990)(quoting Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
36. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(securities claims); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(RICO and Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust).
37. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 111 S. Ct. 2050 (1991).
38. 111 S. Ct. 1647(1991).
39. Id. at 1652.
40. Gilmer raised a "host of challenges," including arbitrator bias, limited discovery,
and lack of written opinions. Id. at 1654-55.
41. Id. at 1654.
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Alexander by pointing out that the issue in that case was whether a
discharged employee whose grievance had been arbitrated pursuant to an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement was precluded from
subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon the conduct that was
the subject of the grievance.4'
D. The 5th Circuit's Response to Gilmer
On remand, with orders to reconsider Alford in light of the
findings in Gilmer, the Fifth Circuit reversed its original opinion, and held
that the arbitration clause was enforceable. Although the court
acknowledged that Alexander stood for the fact that federal courts had
been assigned plenary power over Title VII cases, they concluded that
"[b]ecause both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes..
. we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration."' This opinion, the first federal appellate court
opinion to subject Title VII claims to compulsory arbitration, contains a
cursory one page analysis.
The Fifth Circuit failed to consider the "legislative intent" test set
out by the Supreme Court, which Title VII was found to satisfy in
Alexander, and which was not considered by the Court in Gilmer. The
Court's rationale that Title VII and the ADEA are "similar statutes"
overlooks not only important differences between the Acts, but the fact
that the opinion in Gilmer, an ADEA case, did not even address the issues
crucial to the resolution of a Title VII case.
The Gilmer Court did not discuss the language in Alexander
indicating that Title VII rights are important enough to make it "plain that
federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance
with Title VII."" Although this would seem to be an issue the Gilmer
Court should have addressed, the simple explanation for the lack of
discussion of this issue is that Congressional intent regarding the ADEA
and Title VII was not even an issue in Gilmer. Gilmer conceded that
nothing in the text of the ADEA or the legislative history would preclude
the use of arbitration to enforce the contractual provisions at issue. The
Court granted certiorari in Gilmer "to resolve a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals regarding the arbitrability of ADEA claims."' There is no
such conflict between the Courts of Appeals with respect to the
42. Id. at 1656.
43. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
44. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
45. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651.
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arbitrability of Title VII discrimination claims.' Gilmer, therefore,
cannot be read to overturn the reasoning in Alexander, given that the
central issues in the two cases were unrelated.
The Fifth Circuit should have considered that, in distinguishing
Alexander simply as a case involving collective bargaining, the Supreme
Court engaged in a very superficial analysis. Although the facts of
Alexander were in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, the
fact that the Court distinguished Alexander as a collective bargaining case
cannot be read to require a judicial forum only when the agreement to
arbitrate is reached via collective bargaining. The analysis in Alexander
centered on whether Congress evinced an intent to preserve judicial
remedies, in addition to other remedies, whether they be provided for by
statute or agreed to by contract. The Alexander Court reached its
conclusions without relying on the fact that the arbitration in question was
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The concern that
arbitration in the collective bargaining context may not protect the rights of
individual employees was relegated to one footnote in the opinion.'
In the final analysis, the first Alford decision, a Title VII case,
was based on a Supreme Court case where the intent of Congress was
determined to include preservation of a judicial forum for Title VII
disputes. The Fifth Circuit has reversed this decision, based on a Supreme
Court case where the intent of Congress was not an issue and where Title
VII was not involved.
The fact that the Supreme Court remanded Alford to be
reconsidered in light of Gilmer did not require the Fifth Circuit to reverse
their decision. A more thorough analysis of the differences between the
cases would have been in order. Certainly, the Alford court's cursory
treatment, calling the ADEA and Title VII "similar statutes," ignores
significant differences between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
ADEA with respect not only to their legislative histories, but their judicial
histories as well.
46. As the Fifth Circuit itself noted, "we regard Alexander's rationale as broad enough
to speak to any arbitration of Title VII claims. Two other circuits have already so held.
(citations omitted) No circuit court has held otherwise." Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (1990).
47. Lieberman, supra note 7, at 1833. See also Swenson v. Management Recruiters
Intern. Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (1988) where the court reasoned that "[a]lthough
Alexander involves a collective bargaining agreement, and not a commercial arbitration
agreement under the FAA, this fact should not change the Court's analysis. . . . That
decision turned not on the fact that a collective bargaining arbitration was. involved, but
instead on the unique nature of Title VII."
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IV. THE "INHERENT CONFLICT" TEST APPLIED TO THE
CIviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
In addition to legislative statements that Congress intended to
preclude Title VII cases from mandatory arbitration, there is ample
evidence suggesting that there exists an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Act. Since an
inherent conflict is present, Title VII satisfies the second criterion
established by the Supreme Court (although a statute does not have to
satisfy both in order to be "protected").
The arbitration of Title VII claims undermines the investigatory
and enforcement mechanisms of the Civil Rights Act, which provides that
the EEOC be notified and given an opportunity to remedy the
discrimination before an individual grievant has the right to file a civil
suit.' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "[a]ny
procedure that detracts from the EEOC charge requirement would
undermine Congress' design, since the charge not only informs the EEOC
of the particular discrimination, but may also identify other unlawful
practices."' The court recognized that one of the purposes of the Civil
Rights Act was to rid society of discrimination, not necessarily to provide
redress for individual cases.' 0  Allowing discrimination cases to be
submitted to arbitration rather than brought to the attention of the EEOC
impairs a major function of the Act: to provide for the investigation and
remedy of discriminatory employment practices. A case that goes to
arbitration will not be brought to the attention of the EEOC, and a
valuable opportunity for remedying other instances of discrimination is
lost. The Court in Alexander recognized the remedial aspect of Title VII
when it stated that "the private litigant not only redresses his own injury
but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory practices."s
The argument that mandatory arbitration usurped the authority of
48. 42 (J.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) provides: "Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a
person claiming to be aggrieved. ... the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge...
within ten days and make an investigation thereof."
49. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (1989).
50. One commentator has suggested that "public policy should prevent enforcement of
arbitration agreements when the dispute involves statutes or other legal rules designed to
achieve ends other than doing justice between the parties to a dispute." Stewart E. Sterk,
Agreements to Arbitrate: The Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 481, 543 (1981).
51. Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
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a federal regulatory agency was countered by the Court in Gilmer5 2 by
asserting that "the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the
enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration."' It
analogized to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is
instrumental in enforcing the Securities Acts, which the Court has
explicitly held to be appropriate for arbitration.' There is, however, a
fundamental difference between the operation of the EEOC and the SEC.
The EEOC requires notification by a grievant before the individual is
allowed to initiate a lawsuit, whereas the SEC does not. If arbitration is
compelled, there will be no incentive to file with the EEOC, which has a
right to discover and remedy the situation.s
The Court tries to lessen the importance of this fact in Gilmer by
pointing out that a grievant is always free to file a charge with the EEOC,
even if he is not able to file a civil action. This rationalization overlooks
an obvious purpose of requiring notification -- Congress thought that
people would not voluntarily report abuses to the EEOC. Making
notification mandatory ensures that the agency responsible for monitoring
and remedying discrimination in the workplace is made aware of instances
of discrimination. Involvement by the EEOC is crucial, for instance,
where there is a pattern of discrimination by one employer or industry.
Notification by an individual is the necessary first step of the process of
investigating and rectifying other violations by the same employer.
Allowing a grievant with a discrimination claim to go to arbitration,
whether it be mandatory or not, circumvents the only process by which the
government can discover other cases of discrimination!"
The structure of the Civil Rights Act enforcement mechanism also
suggests that restricting a grievant to only one remedial forum is contrary
to the underlying purpose of the Act. Title VII gives federal courts broad
remedial powers. These powers can be exercised whether or not the
EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. This
overlapping system of remedies shows strong Congressional intent to
provide victims of discrimination with multiple fora.' This goal would
clearly be frustrated by leaving grievants with only one choice in
52. The argument in Gilmer was in the context of the ADEA, which is also enforced
under the direction of the EEOC.
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1 I1 . Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991).
54. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(l) (1982).
56. See Nicholsonv. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989).
57. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-47 (1974)("legislative
enactments in this area [Title VII] have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or
overlapping remedies against discrimination.")
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arbitration.
There are also procedural limitations to arbitration that may
hamper enforcement by the EEOC - arbitrators may lack equitable powers
to prohibit future discrimination, and may not be able to deal with a
situation involving a large plaintiff group. Again, the adjudication of a
Title VII claim serves not only to redress the harm to the grievant, but
provides a chance for the EEOC to examine the employer's practices to
determine if other similar cases exist. Arbitration is poorly suited for this
function, since an arbitrator hears only single cases, and the arbitrator's
remedial powers are limited to that case.'a Similarly, arbitrators are
powerless to issue injunctions. Indeed, Justice Stevens reminded the Court
of the federal court's injunctive powers in his Gilmer dissent: "[a]s this
Court previously has noted, authorizing the courts to issue broad,
injunctive relief is the cornerstone to eliminating discrimination in
society.""
The Court in Alexander noted several reasons why arbitration
would be inappropriate for resolution of Title VII claims. One concern
was that an arbitrator's expertise is usually in the rules of the industry, not
the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues." Other concerns
included: the fact that the record of the proceedings is not complete; the
usual rules of evidence do not apply; and the rights provided by the rules
of civil procedure are not available.6' This reasoning has usually been
dismissed by more recent court decisions, which have read this part of the
opinion as simply reflecting the Court's outdated suspicions of the arbitral
process.62 In a recent case, when a grievant attempted to raise the lack
58. G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is
Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute' for the Courts? 68 TEX. L. REv. 509
(1990).
59. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1660 (1991)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 1657.
61. Id.
62. In Gilmer, plaintiff raised a "host of challenges to the adequacy of arbitration
procedures." The Court responded:
Such generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants," and as such, they are "far
out of step with our current strong endorsement of our federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes."
Id. at 1654 (quoting Rodriguez De Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989)).
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of procedural safeguards as part of his case, the Court disregarded this
argument because the competence of arbitrators and the Court's confidence
in their ability has increased dramatically since Alexander was decided.'
Rather than simply reflecting a suspicion of arbitrator
competence, the Court's reasoning in Alexander may also be read as
questioning whether arbitration, however proficient, is adequate to provide
the kind of enforcement of civil rights that Congress intended. The
opinion recognized that arbitral procedures, while well suited to the
resolution of contract disputes, were "a comparatively inappropriate forum
for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII."" This assertion
of arbitration's inappropriateness in the Title VII context does not seem to
be grounded on a suspicion of arbitral competence, but on a concern that
discrimination claims are better suited for the courtroom.
Admittedly, many of the same arguments were made and rejected
by the Court against the enforcement of arbitration agreements related to
ADEA claims in Gilmer. It is arguable however, that rights relating to
race and sex discrimination should be given a higher level of protection
than age discrimination claims. Notwithstanding the fact that the ADEA
and Title VII are completely different statutes with different legislative
histories, many authorities, including the Supreme Court, believe there is
something more invidious about race and sex discrimination than there is
about age discrimination. The Court has in principle agreed that a
difference in treatment may be acceptable, noting that the elderly have not
been subject to a history of bias like victims of sex and race
discrimination.' The relative importance of the rights involved in these
statutes can be implied by the fact that racial classifications are subject to
"strict scrutiny" by the Court, while sex classifications are given an
intermediate review. Age classifications, however, "are not treated as
suspect or even deserving of the middle standard of review used in gender
discrimination cases."" In all of its analyses, the Court has treated age
discrimination as less harmful than sex and race discrimination.
There are other points made in Alexander which the Gilmer case
63. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483.
64. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
65. The Court has stated that "[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin." Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). For an analysis of why classifying people
according to age is less invidious, see Peter Schuk, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 33-38 (1979).
66. JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 583 (4th ed.
1991).
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
did not address, and which demonstrate the Court's belief that Title VII
rights should be treated differently than other federally granted statutory
rights. The Alexander Court asserted that an employee cannot
prospectively waive his rights under Title VII. These rights, in the
Court's view would include the employee's cause of action under that
Title.67 The Gilmer Court, in dismissing the prohibition against waiver
of rights, fell back on the fact that the Alexander case was in the context
of a collective bargaining agreement. There is nothing in the Gilmer
opinion to indicate that reasoning was meant to apply only to contracts
entered into under collective bargaining agreements. Like much of the
Alexander opinion, it is a statement of the Court's determination of the
intent of Congress with respect to enforcement of the Civil Rights Act.
The logic is just as applicable to the plaintiff in Alford, who, pursuant to
an employment contract, prospectively waived her right to a judicial forum
for resolution of a dispute concerning her right to be free from
discrimination.
V. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that some statutory rights are beyond
the scope of binding arbitration agreements. One test is that Congress
evince an intent to protect those rights from judicial waiver. The Court
itself found intent with respect to Title VII rights in Alexander. In that
same case, the Court demonstrated why arbitration was not compatible
with the enforcement of those rights, satisfying the second test the Court
established. Without discussing these points beyond saying that ADEA
and Title VII are "similar civil rights statutes," the Fifth Circuit relying on
a case that did not even put the intent of Congress in issue, has become
the first appeals court to hold that an employee can waive the right to a
judicial forum to enforce Title VII violations. In doing so, the court has
compromised an important tool for remedying discrimination in our
society. The fact that the decision was made with no analysis of the issues
involved also does a disservice to those who legislated and, over the years,
upheld, the right of a victim of discrimination to have access to a judicial
forum.
Mark D. Klimek
67. Alexander, 415 U.S. it 51.

